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This paper analyses transfer systems from the central government to works deligated to private firms by 
local governments.  There are two types of firms which are delegated to do the work, i.e. an efficient type 
and an inefficient type.  The information about the efficiency of firms is the private information for the firms 
themselves and the local government, which is not known by the central government.  Firms exert efforts to 
reduce the cost of undertaking works which is determined by their proper efficiency levels, and the central 
government cannot observe how much effort to reduce the firms’proper cost for undertaking works is exerted. 
We consider that it is possible for collusions between local governments and firms to emerge by means of side-
payments between them.  We derive the optimal values of levels of costs for works and optimal output levels 
under the optimal transfer schemes under asymmetric information, then we compare them with those values 
under complete information.  While Besfamille （2004） also analysed the problem in the similar context but 
under the assumption of the exogenously given value of output, we analyse it under the assumption of variable 
levels of it.


















　Cramer et al.（1996），Bucovetsky et al.（1998），Lockwood（1999），Boadway et al（1999），
Corns and Silva（2002）は，政府間の移転の設計や地方公共財の水準に対して誘因問題がどのよ
































3） 水田（2010）は，Corns and Silva（2002）で行われた，地域間の公共財供給の固有費用が異なる場合の
分析に加えて，地域間の固有の一人当たり所得水準が異なる場合について分析を行っている。




































































































θh~｝と最終的な配分｛q（m~）, C（m~）, t（m~）, s（m~）, ρ｝を示す一つのペア｛μ, y（m~）｝から構成




















































































































































e1, eh, q1, qh

























11） 中央政府にとっての最大化問題（Alh）を解いて得られる (24)式～ (30)式の導出方については，稿末付録
2で示している。
12） 問題（Alh）の結果（24）～（28）は，Besfamille（2004）において，これと対応する企業配置［All］におけ




































































e1, eh, q1, qh
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